Introduction
In this chapter we introduce some ideas about coercion in public finance using recent work in the literature as a foundation, while briefly illustrating the connection between selected aspects of this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of coercion in a public finance setting.
Coercion in public finance arises from two essential sources: (i) external control of individuals and that of the country exercised through threats of violence and sanctions; and (ii) as a by-product of the compromises that citizens must agree to in a democratic society. In this chapter we focus on the second source or type of coercion, assuming that the fiscal systems we consider are compatible with a stable democratic society in which the state has a legitimate and constitutionally circumscribed monopoly on violence. 1 This assumption is of course a big one.
Nonetheless, as we hope will become clear in what follows, important issues of definition and analysis still remain before a full understanding of the nature of coercion in modern fiscal systems can be achieved.
To fix ideas, it is useful to begin with an example that we have used in earlier work (Winer, Tridimas and Hettich 2014, hereafter WTH 2014) . Consider a sizeable group of citizens who have come together in a room for a common purpose and who must collectively set the temperature on a thermostat and pay for the resulting use of energy. Inevitably in such a group, some people will be too hot and some too cold, and even those for whom the temperature is just right may be unhappy with the balance they face between what they pay and what they get. Individuals can escape this situation if they move rooms or leave the building that represents the collectivity in the example. But if they stay, they must cope with the coercion implied by their assent to the collectively made decision. Coercion for any individual in this example -roughly speaking, the difference between what they get and what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-price that they have to pay -cannot be avoided whatever practical collective choice process is used.
Fiscal coercion of this kind, which arises naturally in all liberal democratic societies, is one of the foundations of what is perhaps the most famous diagram in Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent (1962, fig 3, p.71) . This diagram endogenizes the constitutional choice of a decision rule for the making of fiscal and other decisions as the outcome of minimization of the sum of two types of costs: expected external costs that fall with the proportion of citizens required for a decision to be taken; and expected decision-making costs that rise with this proportion. As they also argue, there is no obvious reason why the optimal, cost-minimizing solution should require a simple majority.
'External costs' in the Calculus of Consent are the equivalent of coercion in our stylized example, though they are not referred to as such in the book. Despite the centrality of coercion to the Calculus, an exact definition of coercion is not provided nor has it been in their subsequent work. More generally, while philosophers and legal experts have explored its nature at length, work on coercion in economics has lagged behind that in other disciplines even though a concern with it often lies beneath the surface, especially when taxation is involved.
The exception in economics is the literature on mechanism design, recently reviewed by Ledyard (2014) , which is built on the early work of Wicksell (1896) and his student Lindahl (1919) . The early work was aimed at establishing a fiscal system with public goods that is economically efficient while at the same time minimizing (Wicksell) , or even eliminating (Lindahl) remains an active area of research.
In the next section we briefly summarize our understanding of how fiscal coercion may be formally defined and used in fiscal analysis when citizens are constrained to remain in the room, so to speak, based on our earlier work. That exit from the community is prevented (or prohibitively costly) is a second important underlying assumption of the present analysis. We then develop an alternative definition of coercion in section three that aims at insuring the aggregate compatibility of individual views about coercion when individual tastes for public goods and individual incomes are both heterogeneous as well as correlated, and we explore some of its implications for fiscal analysis.
2.
The individual-in-society, the individual-as-dictator and imposition of coercion constraints in a social planning problem A formal definition of fiscal coercion for an individual requires that a counterfactual be defined, so that an actual situation in which a taxpayer finds himself can be compared to one that the individual regards as non-coercive. 2 This counterfactual may be one in which the individual receives in public services what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-price that must be paid, a formulation of the counterfactual implicitly used in the example stated earlier, or, analogously, one in which he or she pays what they think is appropriate for the public services actually provided.
The former approach is the one used by Breton (1996) and is implicit, we think, in work by 2 'Non-coercive' does not necessarily mean that same thing as 'voluntary'. For a deeper discussion of related issues in the definition of coercion, see Congleton (2014 Sehili and Martinez-Vazquez (2014) .
Both of these approaches are part of what we have referred to as individual-in-society definitions. To formalize the approach in which the individual takes as given the socially determined tax rate , let * be the maximized utility that a citizen enjoys under specified counterfactual conditions, and be the utility he or she actually enjoys from the operation of the public sector. In this individual-in-society approach to defining coercion, the individual determines the level of public good G* that maximizes her utility subject to income that may be a function of the tax rate. Coercion is then defined as the difference between the resulting counterfactual utility and the utility conferred by the actual fiscal system:
{ } A second approach begins with the assumption that appropriate treatment of an individual by the fiscal system is what that person would want if he or she was a dictator. This is the individual-as-dictator approach, first suggested by Usher.
3 Coercion is then calculated as the difference between utility with the 'dictator's' preferred outcome and the actual utility experienced in the world as it is. In a simple version of this approach, the individual-as-dictator with income determines a proportional tax rate t and the level of the public good G by maximizing utility subject to the government budget constraint ∑ = , where denotes the number of taxpayers. Coercion is calculated as: An additional issue to be decided using either of the two approaches outlined is whether only citizens who lose relative to the counterfactual are to be considered coerced, or whether, as in WTH 2014, all citizens for whom the differentials above are non-zero are to be included in the measure of coercion.
Coercion constrained optimal policy
A society interested in liberty will set limits on the coercion that can be imposed on its individual members by the state. Studying the implication of such limits is therefore of interest, and doing so is easier if there are analytically tractable definitions of coercion like those illustrated above. This brings us to the question of whether to apply coercion constraints at the level of the individual, or at some aggregate level.
In accordance with Wicksell, who advocated approximate unanimity among groups as a way of minimizing coercion, a constraint involving individuals or groups may be specified as * − ≤ ,
where the subscript refers to individuals or to specific social groups.
A more relaxed approach that allows for stronger policy judgments, and a greater degree 4 It may be noted that a median voter is essentially a dictator imposing coercion on everyone else.
of coercion in whatever allocation emerges, bears some similarity to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for potential compensation (in contrast to the strict Pareto criterion). This involves the use of a constraint on the sum of individual utility differences, such as
A social planning problem with a simple fiscal system and coercion constraints can be written as follows, where F is the social objective:
It may be noted that when an individual-in-society definition of the coercion is used to define the counterfactual, the degree of coercion is endogenous in this problem since the planner must observe coercion constraints, which affects the choice of fiscal instruments and so the nature of coercion in the solution. On the other hand, if an individual-as-dictator approach is used, the counterfactual depends only on preferences, technology and endowments, and is therefore independent of the planner's objective.
It is also interesting to note, as Munger (2014) Imposing coercion constraints on a social planning problem is one way of investigating the implications of limitations on coercion for the nature of optimal fiscal systems. This procedure is similar to imposing equity constraints in an inquiry about the kind of tax system that is best suited to achieving an equitable tax burden. Indeed, investigations of these kinds may be regarded as complements in the present context. For Wicksell knowingly avoided the equity problem in his seminal pursuit of a fiscal system that is simultaneously efficient and coercion-minimizing, by assuming at the outset that the problem of distribution had somehow been solved before the legislature acted. Whether the related problems of coercion and of equity in tax design should be tackled simultaneously or in some specific sequence is an open and longstanding question.
Any sort of constraint, whether directed at equity or coercion that is imposed on an optimizing planner will reduce social welfare (Kaplow, 2001) . From a social planning point of view, this issue could be dealt with by folding coercion constraints and equity constraints into a social welfare function, leading then to an efficient or socially optimal degree of coercion and to an efficient degree of inequity. However, doing so may not be the best way to proceed if the concerns behind these constraints serve broad social objectives that are not clearly subsumed by the usual utilitarian approach to public finance.
An individual-as-planner definition of coercion and some of its implications.
A potential problem with both the individual-in-society and individual-as-dictator definitions is that in the counterfactual, each individual desires a different fiscal mix. With individuals having different incomes and tastes for the public good, the desired levels of the fiscal instruments are almost surely inconsistent with each other in the aggregate. This inconsistency suggests that an analysis based on such definitions of coercion contain within them an element of social instability.
For this reason, we introduce a third definition of coercion, the difference between individual utility in a Lindahl equilibrium and the actual utility conferred by the prevailing fiscal mix. This is an example of an individual-as-planner approach to the definition of coercion suggested by Boadway (2014) . In a Lindahl solution, there is no coercion and all decisions are mutually consistent. In this section we specify a simple Lindahl-like equilibrium in which all citizens must contribute, and then use this as basis for defining coercion and comparing its nature in an optimal tax system and in an electoral equilibrium. In this investigation, individuals are heterogeneous; they differ in their (exogenously defined) incomes, tastes for a single pure public good, and in their degree of political influence.
We begin this comparative analysis with the specification of a simple fiscal system.
Assume there is a society of citizen-taxpayers indexed by . Each individual maximizes a CobbDouglas utility function defined over private consumption and a public good , has an (exogenous) income and pays a proportional income tax at rate . Thus,
Here the parameter 0 < < 1, ∈ [ , ], ℎ 0 < , < 1, denotes the intensity of taste for the public good of each citizen-taxpayer, and has mean � = ∑ .
Normalizing the unit price of the public good to unity, the budget constraint of the government is
We note that along with the stability of fiscal institutions and the costliness of exit from the community, the exogeneity of incomes is a third major assumption of our analysis.
A Lindahl-like solution
If coercion is to be eliminated in the Lindahl solution, each person must face a personalized price for the public good, , such that ∑ = 1 and such that each person optimizes their own welfare at that tax-price with exactly the same level of the public good provided to everyone.
Each individual maximizes their utility (6) subject to their Lindahl budget constraint + = , leading to the reduced form utility function
Maximization of (7) with respect to gives = , the size of the public good that prefers at the tax-price . Inverting the latter yields the condition that defines the maximum non-coercive tax-price (the demand price) at which every citizen is content with the same, utility maximizing level of the public good, that is, = .
Now let the covariance between citizen income and taste for the public good be written as
where if the rich have less (more) intense tastes for the public good than the poor, 2 < (>) 0.
Then using the condition ∑ = 1 (tax-prices sum to 1) and the covariance formula, it can be seen that size of the public good in the Lindahl solution has the general form
In view of (9), each individual pays a Lindahl tax of = . 6
Substitution of (9) into (6) gives the indirect utility of individual in the Lindahl solution that we shall use in our comparison of coercion in the optimal tax and electoral equilibrium situations described below:
Before proceeding, it is of interest to derive the analogue to the formula in Buchanan (1964) that shows when the Lindahl tax share will rise, remain constant, or fall with income -that is, be 6 We may use the latter to calculate an economy-wide average income tax rate as follows. Funding requires a tax revenue of ∑ = which implies that the notional tax rate is = � + 2 � . However, this is not the actual rate levied on taxpayers in a Lindahl solution. Each individual pays a personalized tax tailored to their preferences.
progressive, proportional or regressive with respect to income.
7 Given = , it can be seen that = 1 + 1 − 1 . Since in a Lindahl equilibrium = 0 , because everyone demands the same level of , we can multiply through by to put this in elasticity form. Thus we can write: = 1 + . In words, in the Lindahl solution, we have that the elasticity of the tax share with respect to income = 1 + the elasticity of with respect to income. Thus if the latter elasticity is greater than 0, the Lindahl tax price schedule (if we can think of it as such) will be progressive in our model economy.
The optimal tax solution
In the traditional social planner or optimal tax approach (OT), the government sets the proportional tax rate in (7) at a level that is completely unconstrained by the coercive character of its actions, maximizing a social welfare function that we assume is the unweighted sum of individual utilities:
Maximizing S with respect to and using (7), we obtain the social welfare maximizing size of the public good, and the corresponding proportional tax rate:
The indirect utility of citizen-voter in this optimal tax scheme then can be stated as
An electoral equilibrium
Before calculating and comparing coercion levels under social planning and in a political equilibrium, we must also solve for indirect utility in the electoral equilibrium. When the fiscal mix is decided by the outcome of competitive elections, policy outcomes reflect a balancing of the heterogeneous economic interests of citizens. This sort of balance can be modeled using a probabilistic spatial voting model (see Coughlin 1992 , or Mueller 2003 . In such a setting, electoral equilibrium can be replicated using a Representation Theorem of the sort described by Coughlin (1992) , by Hettich and Winer (1999) and by others. This involves maximization of a synthetic political support function defined over individual indirect utilities, where the weights on each citizen's utility reflect their relative political influence in the electoral equilibrium.
We proceed assuming that such a representation theorem applies. Let denote the normalized relative political influence of citizen in the electoral equilibrium, so that ∑ = 1.
Equilibrium values of and maximize the support function
This support function looks like a social welfare function, but it is not. The weights do not reflect a normative view about the distribution of welfare, but rather are determined in the Nash electoral equilibrium. In this case, in the version of the theorem used here, the outcome also lies on the Pareto frontier, though not the one consistent with the OT solution in which each individual's welfare is weighted equally.
Let 2 denote the covariance between citizen influence , and taste for the public good ,
where if those with low (high) have more political influence, then 2 < (>)0. Maximizing (14) and using 2 we obtain the equilibrium fiscal system with one pure public good and a proportional tax on income:
Substituting into the utility function (6) leads to the the indirect utility of voter-taxpayer in this electoral equilibrium,
Who is coerced, and when?
We now proceed with an analysis of coercion in OT and in the electoral equilibrium using the Lindahl solution as the standard of reference to define coercion in each case. We begin with the optimal tax solution.
Coercion under the OT social planner
Comparing (10) and (13), we have
We may say that when > , citizen is coerced by the social planner. On the other hand, when < , citizen benefits from the coercion forced on the rest of the polity.
From (17) we see that the sign of the utility differential − depends crucially on � relative to , and the sign of 2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the public good. There are three cases to consider, namely, (i) richer citizens have a relatively lower taste for the public good; (ii) the opposite case, where richer citizens have a relatively higher taste for the public good; and (iii) the case in which income and preferences for the public good are independent.
(i)
When richer citizens have a relatively lower taste for the public good, 2 < 0, in which
Since for small values of we may use the approximation (1 − ) ≈ − , the difference in (18) yields the following quadratic equation
Denoting ( > 0 and
Of the above, only the sign of 1 is unambiguously positive, but at this level of generality we cannot tell whether it is larger or smaller than one. As for 2 , we note that neither its sign nor its size is unambiguous. We therefore list all possible combinations and the corresponding signs of − . Figure 1 below illustrates graphically what is involved in each case:
(a) 1 < 1 and 1 < 2 < 1 . Then
(ii) When rich people have a higher taste for the public good, we have 2 > 0 . In this case
Since for small values of we may use the approximation (1 − ) ≈ − , the difference in (18) yields the following second order polynomial
Working as above, the roots of the quadratic equation are
The negative root 1 does not make economic sense. We then have (a) 1 < 0 and
Figure 2 illustrates these cases.
(iii)
In the case where income and preferences for the public good are independent of each other, 2 = 0 , so that (17) yields
That is, taxpayers with a public good taste smaller than the mean � lose in the counterfactual relative to OT. 
Coercion in an electoral equilibrium
Working as before, we obtain
As with equation (17), the sign of (21) is ambiguous and depends on � relative to , the sign of 2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the public good, as well as the correlation between political influence and taste for the public good, 2 . With each one of 2 and 2 taking positive, zero and negative values, we have a total combination of nine possible constellations, each one leading to a number of sub-cases. So to go forward, we simplify further.
If it is plausible that the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good, we have 2 < 0 . If it is further assumed that those with a high taste for are also politically more influential -that is, that the poor have greater influence than the rich, then 2 > 0 . We then have On the other hand, if the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good and they are also politically more influential or, equivalently, those with low taste for the public good are more influential, so that 2 < 0 , expression (21) yields the quadratic equation
The roots of (22) (i.a) 0 < 2 < 1 and
(ii.a) 2 < 0 and
A comparison of OT and electoral equilibrium
Finally we compare coercion with the OT solution and in an electoral equilibrium by considering the welfare differentials (17) and (21). We might expect coercion under a social planner to always exceed that in the electoral equilibrium, because the social planner is allowed to coerce anyone to any extent, as a matter of social solidarity, as long as social welfare increases.
However, this generalization does not hold in our simple model. After substituting from (17) and (21) and manipulating, we see that if 2 > (<) 0 , when
it is the case that − < (>) − . So coercion for an individual under the social planner may be lower or higher than in our democracy. Of course − = − when
Concluding remarks
Social interaction necessarily requires limits on individual choices. As soon as we are part of a group, various opinions must be heard and compromises must be made. Difficult questions will inevitably arise about how limits to individual actions are to be determined, how such limits or rights are to be defined, and how they will be enforced once agreement on their nature is achieved.
Coercion of the individual by the group is an inevitable outcome of our struggle to deal with these issues.
Although coercion is therefore essential to, and plays a key role in the Calculus of Consent, it has not been well-defined or studied extensively in economics. A careful definition requires the use of a counterfactual, non-coercive social state against which the coercion inherent in any particular situation is to be judged. We have outlined three different approaches to the choice of a given the socially determined level of public goods (the socially determined tax rate they must pay); and the individual-as-planner counterfactual, which we have tentatively explored in this chapter. In the individual-as-planner approach, in contrast to the other approaches, all counterfactual positions are explicitly required to be mutually consistent. The Lindahl solution serves as one obvious choice for such a counterfactual, and it is the one that we have employed in our preliminary investigation.
Our analysis of the individual-as-planner approach to coercion has led to somewhat complex results about the nature of fiscal coercion. In the OT solution, if we treat only those who lose relative to the counterfactual as being coerced, the extent of coercion depends entirely on the nature of an individual's taste for the public good relative to a critical threshold that depends on average tastes, average income and the correlation of tastes and income. The sign of the correlation of income and tastes determines how low or high taste citizens fare relative to the counterfactual.
In the electoral equilibrium, there is also a critical level that can be compared to an individual's taste for public goods to determine the nature of coercion, but now (and not surprisingly) the threshold taste level depends on the correlation of income and political influence as well as the correlation of income and tastes.
Some statements can be made about the comparative nature of coercion in OT and in the electoral equilibrium; in particular, it is not the case that the (coercion-unconstrained) social planner will always impose more coercion than occurs in the electoral equilibrium. But simple
general rules about what does happen do not seem possible even in the stripped down model we have explored. Perhaps others can find sensible assumptions that lead to more definite results.
The analysis we have conducted is subject to two fundamental assumptions: that the power of the state is suitably restrained; and that exit from the community is prohibitively expensive. In addition, we have assumed that income is determined independently of the fiscal system. A full analysis of coercion in public finance and, in this respect, of the calculus of consent, awaits a more complete analysis that relaxes these assumptions while deriving general propositions about coercion that are relevant to modern fiscal systems.
